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private sectors and unemployment. It is shown that while the workers in the private sector
always support rapid reforms, the workers in the  state  sector and  the  unemployed will
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unemployment and support for the reforms is then tested empirically using regional data
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"There are still two options - the road to reform and the other road."
1
Few years ago, the processes of economic transition started in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. At the beginning, economic reforms enjoyed remarkable
support from virtually every part of the society. However, the economic collapse that
followed by far surpassed the expectations. Public support for the reforms deteriorated
quickly and the reformers have been replaced by post-communists and/or other leftist
parties in the second elections throughout the region. Nevertheless, opinion polls
suggest that most of the electorate still supports continuation of the reforms in general.
What they are apparently voting for is rather a change in the reform strategy, not a
complete reversal.
 2 Moreover, they seem to have remained critical about the original
reform strategy even after the benefits of the  reforms such as  rising GDP  and
stabilization of inflation became evident.
This development is somewhat surprising: the voters vote against the reformers
- yet they have benefited from the reforms or at least expect to benefit in the future.
Moreover, they do not want to reverse the reforms altogether - only a change in the
strategy. There are several possible explanations for this kind of voting behavior. One
is that the voters only look backwards, not forwards, when making their choice at the
polls. It could be that they lack experience with democratic elections and thus easily
fall prey to populism. It is also quite possible that voters are simply unhappy about
other effects of the reforms such as increased crime and overall moral decline.
3
However,  all  there answers should be equally important for all transition countries and
thus  fail to explain why political sustainability of reforms is a problem in some
countries but not  in others (for  example the  Czech  Republic).
4 In this paper, we
attempt to construct a theoretical model of a transition economy that explains this
phenomenon. The key ingredients are the threat of unemployment and diminishing
probability of switching from a job in the state sector to a private sector job.
The importance of unemployment during the transition has been stressed in
several recent papers. The most noteworthy examples are Aghion and Blanchard
[1994], Burda [1993] and Rodrik [1995]. While most models are mainly concerned
with the impacts of speed and sequencing of reforms upon their sustainability in
general, Rodrik [1995] analyzed the  role unemp loyment plays in determining the
dynamics of political support for continuation of the reforms.
Rodrik develops a model of a transition economy consisting of two sectors:
low-productivity state sector and high-productivity private sector. At the outset of the
transition, the private sector is small but expands during the transition. At the  same
time, the state sector shrinks. Since the rate at which the state sector contracts is
initially lower than the rate of growth of the private sector, transitional unemployment
                                               
1 Anatoli B. Chubais, Russian President's chief of staff, quoted in International Herald
Tribune, Jan. 2, 1996, p.1.
2 This is true about most or all countries of Centran and Eastern Europe but not necessarily
for some of the countries of the former Soviet Union.
3 See Balcerowicz [1993, Section 6] for related discussion.
4 Klaus [1993] attributes the electoral success of reformers in the Czech Republic to their
ability to win and retain political support for the reforms by, in his words, "permanent campaining."occurs. Rodrik then analyzes evolution of the workers' support for the pace of the
reforms. The pace of the reforms is determined by the extend to which the government
subsidizes the state sector. Rodrik argues that  while the  state sector workers  will
indeed support the reforms at their outset, they will likely oppose them at a later stage.
On the other hand, the unemployed will always favor as rapid reforms as possible as
this increases their chances of getting a job in the private sector.
The result regarding the preferences of the unemployed is somewhat surprising
and seems counterfactual. As we will show, this conclusion is due to the assumption
that unemployment will eventually vanish in the transition economy and that workers
receive no income while unemployed.
We build on Rodrik's model but include three important modifications: long-
run unemployment, inclusion of unemployment benefits in the  government budget
policy and an exogenous shock to the state sector employment at the outset of the
transition. These changes make the model slightly more complicated but also render it
more realistic. More importantly, these modifications overturn the key  results of
Rodrik's analysis and deliver a more appealing prediction regarding voting behavior for
the unemployed. We show that while all voters will support rapid reforms at an early
stage of the reforms, at a later stage both state-sector workers and unemployed
workers  will support a policy change resulting in a reduction in the speed of reforms.
We then test the prediction of our model also empirically using data on recent elections
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Negative impacts of the
economic reforms were distributed disproportionally across individual regions.
Similarly, political preferences of voters also varied substantially across the regions. In
our empirical test, we utilize this fact and attempt to find a relationship between
unemployment and support for reforms.
Our model suggests that voters in the regions hit hard by unemployment will be
more inclined to vote for the parties opposing the reforms, and vice versa. On the other
hand, Rodrik's model delivers precisely the opposite result. We test for the relationship
between unemployment and political support by running regressions of regional
election results on regional unemployment rates. The results show rather strong
positive relationship between unemployment and votes for left-wing parties and
negative relationship between unemployment and votes for pro-reform parties. The
results for nationalists are mixed and rather weak though. Overall, the empirical results
thus throw support behind the results of our model. This indicates that the continuation
of rapid economic reforms is substantially more politically fragile than suggested by
Rodrik's analysis.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II summarized the stylized facts of
transitional unemployment in Centran and Eastern Europe. Section III present the
model and Section IV explains the nature of the flows in and out of employment in the
two sectors and unemployment and resulting expected utilities of the workers. Section
V then analyzes the evolution of workers' preferences for a government  policy and
speed of reforms. Section VI presents the results of the empirical analysis of the data.
Finally, Section VII concludes.II. STYLIZED  FACTS OF TRANSITIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL AND
EASTERN EUROPE
Dynamics and characteristics of unemployment in Centran and Eastern Europe
exhibit several features distinct from unemployment experienced by developed
countries. These distinctions can be briefly summarized as the stylized facts of
transitional unemployment in Centran and Eastern Europe:
Unemployment reached high levels quickly and  has remained  high. Un-
employment  was more or less unknown in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the
transition. Then, however, unemployment rate increased rapidly during the first year of
transition and remained quite high during subsequent years. As can be seen from Table
I, unemployment rate rose from one to two percent in 1990 (six percent in Poland) to
ten to twelve percent in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland and over four percent in the
Czech Republic. Furthermore, while the unemployment rate fell somewhat since then,
the prospects that it would decline substantially in the  future are rather  small.
According to WIIW
5, unemployment rates will be ten to fourteen percent in most
Centran and Eastern Europe countries in 1996, with the notable exception of the
Czech Republic.
Long-term unemployment accounts for a large and still increasing portion of
unemployment. In Poland, 39 % of unemployed by mid 1993 were without work for
more than a year, 14  % for more than two years.
6 In Slovakia, 53  % of the
unemployed were without work for more a year while only 16 % were unemployed for
less than three months (as of the first three quarters of 1995). In the preceding year,
these figures stood at 39 % and 19 %, respectively.
7 According to Boeri [1996], long-
term unemployed account for more than 50 % of total unemployment also in Hungary
and Bulgaria.
Economic  growth and growth of private entrepreneurship seem to have
mattered  little to reduce unemployment, at least for the time being. Expansion of the
newly forming private sectors occurs mainly by recruiting workers from the public
sector, not from the pool of unemployed. According to Aghion and Blanchard [1994],
in Poland "half of all gross flows [in 1992] were directly from employment to
employment, and half to or from unemployment or non  participation."
8 Dorenbos
[1996] makes a similar conclusion regarding Hungary.
Unemployment rates vary substantially across regions. While unemployment is
nearly negligible is some regions (mainly capitals and larger cities), it can be as high as
30 % in other regions. This reflects the unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of
the economic reforms within a country.
These stylized facts are applied in the formulation of the  model in the next
Section.
                                               
5 "Osteuropas Wachstum gebremst, Wiener Institut revidiert Prognose," Die Presse (Austria),
July 13, 1996, p. 23.
6 Aghion and Blanchard [1994], pp. 9-10.
7 Statistical Office of Slovak Republic [1995], p.11.
8 Aghion and Blanchard [1994], p. 9.III. MODEL
In this paper, we construct a model of an economy in transition based on the
model developed in Rodrik [1995]. However, we introduce three modifications:
1.  some agents face long-term unemployment, i.e. once unemployment occurrs it will
not fall below certain positive value;
2.  government's expenditure includes also unemployment benefits and the level of
benefits is positively related to the level of subsidies to the state sector;
3.  exogenous shock occurs in the state sector at the beginning of the transition.
The first two modifications not only make the model more realistic and in line
with the stylized facts of unemployment in Centran and Eastern Europe (see Section
II) - they alter substantially the model's predictions regarding the preferences of the
unemployed. The third modification does not critically affect the results of the analysis
but is included for the sake of convenience (it accelerates the restructuring process in
the early phases of the transition) and realism. We will point out these modifications
again as we go along.
The economy consists of a state sector and a private sector. The number of
workers employed in the state and private sectors is Nt and Mt, respectively, at each
time t. The size of the labor force is normalized to unity so that Nt + Mt + Ut = 1, with
Ut standing for unemployment at time t. At the outset of the transition, most or all
workers are employed in the  state sector  and  unemployment is  negligible. The
transition entails structural changes that result in a contraction of the state sector and
expansion of the private sector. The transition is completed when the sizes of the state
and private sectors reach N* and M*, respectively. However, unlike in the original
Rodrik's models, unemployment does not vanish during the transition, i.e. N*+M*<1.
The process of restructuring goes along the following paths:
(1) () NNU NN 10 0 =- + - ~ * q ;
(2) () NN NN tt t =+ - -- 11 q * , with t > 1;
(3) () MM k MM tt t =+ - -- 11 q *;
(4) Ut = 1 -Nt - Mt   for all t;
where q is the speed of adjustment and k is a coefficient such that 0 < k < 1.
The speed of adjustment q is a function of government's policy: q = q(st), where st is
the level of subsidy per worker in the state sector at time t and q'(st) < 0. Thus, greater
degree of the government's involvement implies lower speed of transition (see below).
Before the outset of the transition, at time t = 0, unemployment is zero. The
restructuring starts at t = 1 and during this period the state sector is subjected to a one-
time exogenous shock  ~ U . This element in the restructuring process is to capture the
shock therapy nature of the reform and refers to the effect of an abrupt liberalization of
prices and foreign trade. The occurrence of the shock at t = 1 constitutes again a
modification to the original Rodrik's model.
Figure I shows the evolution of employment in the state and private sectors,
unemployment and output. These paths are simulated assuming a constant q = .2,
k = .5, N* = .20 and M* = .75.
 The initial employment levels of the state and private
sectors are N0 = .80 and M0 = .20. Finally, output is computed as a sum of the outputsof the two sectors, assuming productivity is unity in the state sector and l = 1.5 in the
private sector (by definition, productivity in the private sector is greater than in the
state sector).
As can be seen in Figure I, unemployment increases sharply after the start of
the transition  and peaks at 20 % in t = 5. Then it declines gradually. Output, similarly,
declines during the early stages of the reforms but it bounces back in and after t = 4.
This is roughly similar to the actual developments recorded in Centran and Eastern
Europe countries - given the simplified nature of the model.
Government policy involves seting the subsidy to the  state sector.
Unemployment benefits and taxes on the private sector are then determined so as to
balance the government budged every period:
(5) Mt tt = (Nt +mUt) st
where st is the per-worker subsidy to the state sector and mst, is the average
transfer payment received by an unemployed worker. The level of unemployment
benefits is determined as a function of the subsidy where m is a positive coefficient.
9
Inclusion of unemployment benefits in government expenditure and linking them with
the  subsidy makes this design of government budget different from the original
Rodrik's model. The expenditure is financed by an income tax on the private sector.
10
The results of the model will not  be  significantly altered if unemployment
benefits  are greater or lower than the subsidy. However, it is quite important that it be
linked to the subsidy. This reflects the intuitive fact that a government that preserves
high subsidies to the state sector usually also tends to be more inclined toward greater
redistribution of income to the poor (i.e. also the unemployed). The level of benefits
here can be understood also as including other aspect of the government's labor market
policy such as setting eligibility requirements, determining the  length of the period
during which benefits are received etc.
The government's choice of the level of subsidies in turn determines the speed
of transition. A high subsidy implies low q and thus a gradual reform. On the other
hand, a low subsidy gives rise to high q and a shock therapy reform is implemented.
Figures II, III and IV show different transition paths resulting from different choices of
q. While Figure I is drawn with q = .20, Figure II uses q = .50, Figure III has q = .05
and in Figure IV q = .01.
The production function in the state and private sectors is Y t = Nt and Yt =
lM t, respectively. Productivity in the state sector is thus unity while private sector's
productivity is l >1. Gross wages in both sectors are equal to the marginal products of
labor in that sector. The net wage in the state sector is then wt
s = (1 + st) and in the
private sector it is wt
p = (l - tt). Income of an unemployed worker is mst (Rodrik's
original model assumes that the income of the unemployed is zero). This has a
significant effect upon determining the voting behavior of unemployed workers as will
become obvious in Section V.
                                               
9 Rodrik's model, on the other hand, corresponds to the case with m = 0.
10 In fact, state-owned enterprises do pay taxes too. The subsidy here can be interpreted as the
net cash inflow to the state sector. It is assumed to be non-negative by definition.IV. FLOWS IN AND OUT OF EMPLOYMENT
The two sectors in the model evolve as follows: The state sector shrinks every
period until its size equals N*. Thus, (Nt - Nt-1) workers are laid off every period. (Mt -
Mt-1) workers are hired every period in the private sector until its size reaches M*.
Since the private sector never shrinks in this model, once hired the workers in the
private sector are never laid off. Due to the initial shock  ~ U and because the speed of
contraction in the state sector is greater than the speed of expansion of the private
sector early in the transition, transitional unemployment occurs. Furthermore, once the
transition started, unemployment rate will never fall below its natural rate U* (thus,
U* = 0 in Rodrik's model).
The remainder of this Section closely follows the way of reasoning of Rodrik,
using the modified underlying assumptions of Section III.
Workers do not need to become unemployed before they can get a job in the
private sector. Thus, state-sector workers as well as unemployed will get a job in the
















At the same time, the probability of losing the job in the state sector (separation














Due to the different speeds of contraction of the state sector and expansion of
the private sector, zt exceeds qt early in the transition while the opposite will eventually
become true as the size of the private sector gets sufficiently large. At this point, new
jobs become available in the state sector as well. The probability that an unemployed

























The instantaneous utility functions of the workers in the state sector, private
sector and the unemployed are given as vt
s, vt
p and vt
u, where vt is an increasing and
concave function of wages wt
i (i=s, p, u).
The expected utility function of a worker who is employed in the private sector
at time t is the sum of his future instantaneous utilities discounted at rate d. Since the
tax is levied on the wages in the private sector, the utility of the workers in this sector
is negatively related to the tax rate tt,









                                               
11 This is identical to Equation (8) in Rodrik [1995].
12 This is identical to Equation (9) in Rodrik [1995].
13 This is identical to Equation (10) in Rodrik [1995].A worker in the state sector can remain in this sector or can be employed in the
private sector or become unemployed. To describe his expected utility function, we
need to determine the probabilities of these three possibilities.
14 The probability that a
worker who is in the state sector at time t will have a private-sector job at time s is r t,
15
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The probability that the worker who held a state-sector job at time t will be
unemployed at time s is ct,
16
(11)
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Finally, the probability that a worker who held a state-sector job at time t will
remain in the state sector also in time s is pt
17
(12) pt = 1 - rt - ct.
Thus, the utility function of a worker who is employed in the state sector at
time t is the sum of his future instantaneous utilities discounted at rate d
18












- å d .
A worker who is unemployed at time t will be employed in the private sector at
time s with the probability rt given above. The probability that this worker will hold a
state-sector job at time s is dt,
19
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The probability that he will remain unemployed is et,
(15) et = 1 - rt - dt.
Thus, the utility function of this worker is
20
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Figures V and VI show the evolution of the probabilities described above. For
a state-sector worker, the probability of getting a job in the private sector, rt, is fairly
high during the early phase of the transition. However, it converges to zero rather
quickly. The probability of becoming unemployed is also rather high early in the
                                               
14 See Rodrik [1995] pp.10-11 for a more detailed derivation.
15 This is identical to Equation (12) in Rodrik [1995].
16 This corresponds to Equation (13) in Rodrik [1995].
17 Equivalent to Equation (14) in Rodrik [1995].
18 Cf. Equation (15) in Rodrik [1995], Rodrik's formulation does not include the third term.
19 Cf. Equation (16) in Rodrik [1995].
20 Cf. Equation (17) in Rodrik [1995], Rodrik's formulation does not include the third term.transition but later it also converges to zero. On the other hand, the probability of
remaining in the state sector is continuously growing and converges to unity.
In the case of an unemployed worker, the probability of getting a job in the
private sector is also fairly high during the early phase of the  transition but it is
declining continuously and approaches zero. The probability of obtaining a state-sector
job is increasing initially but starts to fall later and also converges to zero. Finally,
while the probability of remaining unemployed declines early in the transition, it starts
to increase later and eventually converges to unity.
Thus, as can be seen from the figures, both state-sector workers as well as
unemployed have little prospect of a status change late in the transition process. While
the position of the workers in the state sector is quite similar to the Rodrik's model, the
situation of the unemployed is precisely opposite here. In fact, in Rodrik's model, the
unemployed  will  get  a job  in either  state or a private sector eventually. This
substantially alters the conclusion derived regarding their voting decisions which is the
subject of the next Section.
V. DYNAMICS OF WORKERS' PREFERENCES
In this Section, we will analyze the dynamics of workers' preferences as to the
choice of the speed of reform. We will do this by looking at the  evolution of the
expected utility functions for the three categories of the workers. For the purpose of
this analysis, we take the subsidy as being constant over time and hence denote it as s.
We then study the dynamics of workers' preferences regarding the subsidy.
21 We will
again follow a line of reasoning analogous to Rodrik [1995] and compare our results
with his.
The preferences of the workers in the private sector are clear. Because this
sector never shrinks in the model, they enjoy virtually absolute job security. Since the
tax to finance government expenditure is levied on the private sector, the workers in
this sector will always prefer as small subsidy as possible.
Analyzing the dynamics of the preferences of the state-sector workers is more
complicated. Early in the transition, their expected utility is increasing because of the
possibility to get a job in the private sector. As t gets larger, flows in and out of each
sector become small and eventually cease altogether. This makes the expected utility of
the state-sector workers decline somewhat and converge to a fixed number. For a
higher level of the subsidy the value of this limit will also be higher, and vice versa.
Thus, we can make the following conclusion regarding the preferences of the state-
sector workers (equivalent to Rodrik's Result 1):
Proposition 1: The expected utility of a state sector worker converges in the limit
to a positive value which is strictly increasing in s. The expected utility
converges to this limit from above:
                                               
21 Figure VII shows evolution of expected utility for the three categories of workers receive


























< 0 for t > t*, for a given s.
The first part of Proposition 1 [Equation (17)] holds because as t get large, rt
and ct converge to zero while pt converges to unity. The expected utility of a worker is
thus determined primarily by his expected earnings from a state-sector job and is hence
positively related to the level of subsidy. The second part of Proposition 1 [Equation
(18)] says that there exists a t* such that the expected utility will be decreasing for all
t > t*: Thus, once the transition is beyond t*, the expected utility of the state-sector
workers can only increase by increasing the level of subsidy. This conclusion is not
much different (not surprisingly) from the conclusion derived by Rodrik.
Now we turn to the analysis of the  preferences of the workers who are
unemployed at time t. The position of the unemployed in this model is quite different
than is the case in Rodrik's original model. This is so due  to  two important
modifications: First, unemployment is persistent and thus never drops below certain
level (U*). Second, the unemployed workers receive benefits linked to the per-worker
subsidy received by the state-sector workers. These two modifications are intended to
render the model more realistic.
The evolution of expected utility of the unemployed workers is shown in Figure
VII. It can be seen that the utility initially increases as the probability of getting a
private-sector is increasing early in the transition (see Figure VI). However, as t gets
larger, the probability of getting a private-sector job gradually converges to zero and
the workers are facing a growing probability of remaining unemployed permanently.
This makes their expected utility fall.
Thus, the conclusion derived for the unemployed workers is in fact quite similar
to the conclusion stated for the state-sector workers.
Proposition 2: The expected utility of an unemployed worker converges in the
limit to a positive value which is strictly increasing in s. The expected utility



























< 0 for t > t**, for a given s.
This conclusion is, as a result of the  above discussed  modifications, quite
opposite from Rodrik's result regarding the unemployed. This is due to the modified
assumptions regarding unemployment, as discussed above. This makes our version of
the model more realistic and in accord with the stylized facts of unemployment (see
Section II).The above derived conclusions about the dynamics of expected utility of state-
sector and unemployed workers enables us to derive further conclusions about the
preferences of workers for a particular level of subsidy. We thus now look how
different levels subsidy (and hence different speed of reform) affect the expected utility
of workers in the state sector and the unemployed:
Proposition 3: For l sufficiently high, Wt
s and Wt
u follow  U-shaped curves with











> 0 for large s, i = s, u.
Proposition 3 is derived and proved in Rodrik [1995]
22 for the case of state-
sector workers. After our modifications of Rodrik's model, this result holds also in the
case of the unemployed.
23 Proposition 3 implies that starting with s = 0, expected
utility will initially decline and then increase for increasing values of s. It should be
noted that the condition that l be sufficiently high is more important in the case of the
state-sector workers where significantly higher productivity in the private sector is
necessary for the result to hold. For the unemployed, Proposition 3 holds even for
relatively low l (provided l > 1).
Proposition 3 has an important implication in case when there is an upper limit
on the feasible level of subsidy. Such a limit is likely to be in place especially at the
beginning of the reforms when too high a subsidy would push the wages in the private
sector  below  state-sector wages.
24 Then, workers in the state sector and/or
unemployed may prefer no subsidy rather than the maximum feasible subsidy smax:
Proposition 4: At the outset of the reform, state-sector worker and/or
unemployed will prefer the maximum feasible subsidy smax to zero subsidy if
W0
i(smax) > W0
i(0), where i = s, u. Otherwise, the worker will select s = 0.
25
Proposition 4 describes conditions under which workers in the state-sectors
and/or unemployed will support shock therapy reform (i.e. s = 0) to gradual reform (s
= 0) if elections are held at t = 0.
26
Our  final  conclusion refers to the case when state-sector workers and
unemployed change their minds some time during the course of reforms:
Proposition 5: There exists a T
s (T
u) such that at time t ³ T
s (t ³ T
u), workers in
the state sector (unemployed workers) will always prefer a change from zero
subsidy to any s' (0 < s' £ smax).
27
                                               
22 See Result 3 in Rodrik [1995].
23 The proof of Proposition 3 for the case of the unemployed is analogous to the proof for the
state-sector workers and is thus not presented here to save on space.
24 This is so because of the small size of the private sector and large size of the state sector at
the beginning of the transition. Even small per-capita subsidy might result in too high taxes and thus
making the private sector unattractive.
25 Cf. Result 4 in Rodrik [1995].
26 Note that it is possible that preferences of workers in the state sector and unemployed will
differ. It may well be the case that state-sector workers will be in favor of gradual reform while
unemployed will vote for shock therapy. The opposite is rather unlikely though since the unemployed
stand to gain relatively more from the increased job creation in the private sector in case of rapid
reform.Thus, if elections are held at or after period t = T
s (t = T
u), workers in the state
sector (unemployed workers) will vote for an increase of the subsidy and thus slow
down of the reforms. Note that T
s may not necessarily be the same as T
u. In fact, the




In this Section, we have shown that under the modified assumptions about
unemployment, Rodrik's result regarding the preferences of the unemployed will be
overturned. In fact, the dynamics of the  preferences of the  unemployed follow a
pattern similar to that of the state-sector workers. If the conclusions of this Section are
correct, the parties advocating slow down or even reversal of the reforms should do
better if unemployment is high. This assumption can indeed be tested empirically. In
the next Section, we analyze the relationship between regional election results and
regional unemployment rates (county level) in four Centran and Eastern Europe
countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
VI. EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
In this Section, we perform an empirical test of the relationship between the
voters' preferences and unemployment rate. According to the theoretical model
described in the preceding sections, while rapid reforms may enjoy overall support at
the outset of the transition, the unemployed will support parties advocating slow pace
of reforms if elections are held later in the transition process. This is in sharp contrast
with Rodrik's conclusion that unemployed will actually vote for rapid reforms at any
time during the transition.
The statistics reveal a rather uneven regional distribution of costs and benefits
of the reforms. Unemployment rate is lower and  income  level is higher in some
regions,  especially  urban areas while rural areas are often stricken with extremely high
unemployment and low income levels. Voters' preferences, too, vary substantially from
region to region. In this Section, we will try to determine whether there is a possible
link between the two - regional disparities of economic statistics and different political
developments in regions.
29
To determine whether there is a relationship between economic situation and
voters' preferences, we run regressions of the regional elections results with
unemployment as explanatory variable. Elections results are  expressed as the
percentage of votes received by a party (or candidate) in each region. Unemployment
                                                                                                                                      
27 The proof follows Rodrik [1995]: Let W
i _
(' ) s  with i= s, u, be the limit of expected utility
of state-sector workers and unemployed, respectively, in case when the reforms started off with s = 0




() 0 with i= s, u, be the limit of expected utility of
state-sector workers and unemployed, respectively, in case when s = 0 is sustained. Then from









i(0), with i = s, u.
28 Again, this is so because the unemployed stand to gain relatively more from the increased
job creation in the private sector in case of rapid reform.
29 Our attention is primarily focused on unemployment as this also is the focus of the
preceding Sections. Role of average income levels in determining voters' preferences is briefly
discussed below too but no empirical results are presented to save on space.rates used in the regressions are year-end values pertaining to the election year (if
available) or closest year prior to the elections. All data are at the level of counties
(okres in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, wojewodztwo in Poland and megye in
Hungary). The sample sizes are 76 for the Czech Republic, 38 for Slovakia, 20 for
Hungary and 49 for Poland. The data were compiled from various publications of the
national Statistical Offices of the respective countries as well as press reports.
30
The analysis includes elections to the Czech parliament in June 1992, elections
to the Slovak parliament in June 1992 and September 1994, Polish Sejm (lower house
of the parliament) elections in September 1993, Hungarian parliamentary elections in
May 1994 and the second round of Polish presidential elections in December 1995. We
only analyze the second and subsequent elections after the collapse of the communist
regime. The first post-communists elections are not included because they took place
either before the process of economic reforms started or very early in the transition.
Thus the specific issues pertaining to the process of economic transition were likely not
reflected in the first post-communist elections.
According to the results of the analysis performed in the preceding Sections,
the regional election results of the pro-reform parties should be negatively related to
regional unemployment rate. On the other hand, the votes for the post-communists,
other left-wing parties and nationalists should be positively related to unemployment.
In the remainder of this Section, we estimate the coefficients of unemployment rate for
different regression equations and test whether these coefficients are significant.
As the first test we run regressions for the individual parties with regional
unemployment  rates as explanatory variable. In the regression for the Czech Republic,
an additional regional dummy variable was also included in the data set to distinguish
Bohemian and Moravian counties.
31 Similarly, in the  regressions for Slovakia, the
percentage of the Hungarian minority in the  total population is  included as an
additional explanatory variable.
32
The results of the OLS regressions are summarized in Table II. The fact that
the correlation coefficients do not exceed 0.50 in most cases indicates that while
unemployment may  be an  important factor in determining voters' preferences, it is
certainly not the  sole factor. The regression results overall support the results of the
model derived in the preceding Sections. There are some differences between the four
countries though. In the Czech Republic, all four parties that formed the original
coalition faced negative effect of unemployment - as expected. Three coefficient values
are significant at 10%  or  less. Similarly, all three left-wing parties benefited from
unemployment and two  of  them have significant coefficients. The  impact of
unemployment on nationalist was positive and significant but  with a  very low
correlation coefficient.
                                               
30 See Appendix I for precise statement of sources of data.
31 Bohemia and Moravia are the two parts of the Czech Republic. The dummy takes value of
one if the county is located in Moravia and zero otherwise. This dummy is to capture the preferences
of many Moravians for a greater autonomy of this region. HSD-SMS has made this a center of its
election program.
32 Hungarians make up some 11 % of the total population in Slovakia but they are strongly
concentrated in the regions along the Hungarian border. There are three parties seeking to represent
Hungarian interests in Slovakia.The results for Slovakia are weaker. Two of the three pro-reform parties have
negative coefficient values for unemployment both in 1992 and 1994 (one significant in
1992 and both in 1994). However, the third party has a positive coefficient which is
significant in 1992. For the leftist parties, two coefficients have positive sign both in
1992 and 1994 but only one is significant in each year. The main nationalist party
actually shows precisely opposite result than expected - a negative and significant
coefficient.
Hungarian regression yielded better results with all pro-reform and left-wing
parties having the expected sings of coefficients for unemployment. One party from
each category has a coefficient that is not significant though and these two parties also
have substantially lower correlation coefficients. In the case of nationalists, the results
are mixed and all insignificant.
Finally,  the  results for Poland show  that unemployment is relatively less
important a factor in this country. This is evident from the relatively low values of
correlation coefficients for the parliamentary elections. However, both pro-reform as
well as left-wing parties have the expected sign of coefficients for unemployment and
these are mostly significant. In the presidential elections, on the  other h and,
unemployment did play an important role. The incumbent Lech Wa‡esa incurred a loss
of votes due to unemployment to the benefit of the  post-communist  Alexander
Kwasniewski.
33
Thus overall the  data show a  negative and mostly significant relationship
between the election results of the pro-reform parties and unemployment rates. The
relationship between the election results of the left-wing parties and unemployment is
positive and likewise mostly significant. However, the results for the nationalist parties
are weaker - often non-significant and/or showing wrong sign (i.e. negative).
Another step in the analysis involved running the regressions with the election
results aggregated according to the political orientation of the parties. The parties were
classified into three groups: reformists (REF), leftists (LEFT) and nationalists (NAT).
For Slovakia, ethnic Hungarian parties were classified separately (HUN). The results
of the regressions are summarized in Table III.
34 In some cases, the results for
nationalists were not reported as they were not significant.
The regressions give similar results as above. The results are significant for
both reformists and leftists in Czech 1992 elections and have the right signs: negative
for the reformists and positive for the leftists. In Slovak 1992 elections, the leftists
show a significant positive effect of unemployment while the result for the reformists is
not significant. Similar result is obtained for 1994 but in this year the coefficient for the
reformists is negative - although not  significant.  Nationalists show a significant
relationship only in 1992, however, with a wrong sign. In Hungarian elections,
coefficients  for both reformists and nationalists are significant and have the expected
signs. Similarly, the results for Polish 1993 parliamentary elections are also significant
and have the expected signs for the reformists and leftists.
                                               
33 Interestingly, this transfer of votes turns out to be one-for-one when no other explanatory
variables are included.
34 The data used in these regressions are also presented in Figures VIII through XII.Finally, the third step in the analysis involved running a regression with the
election results aggregated according to the political orientation across all four
countries together.
35 This resulted in a data set with 221 observations. Besides
unemployment  rate corresponding to the election year, country dummy variables were
also included on the right-hand side. Pooled data set is used in order to take advantage
of a larger sample size as well as to capture not only intracountry differences in
unemployment rates but as well intercountry differences. The results are summarized in
Table IV.
The results of this regression again support the result of the model: the election
results of the reformists were negatively affected by unemployment while the election
results of the leftists received a positive effect from unemployment. Both results for
reformists and leftists are thus significant and have the expected sign. The results for
nationalists are also significant but show the opposite sign than expected.
In addition to testing for the role of unemployment in determining voters'
preferences, we also ran regressions which included average wages as an additional
variable besides unemployment. Intuition suggests that voters in the regions that enjoy
higher wages should be more confident about the reforms than the voters in poorer
regions. Thus, average regional wages should be positively related to the election
results of the pro-reform parties and negatively related to the election results of the
left-wing and nationalist parties. However, the results for wages were weaker than the
results for unemployment. Nevertheless, they throw additional support for the
hypothesis that economic factors influence voters' preferences. In particular, pro-
reform parties enjoy greater support in the regions with higher average wages while
left-wing parties fare better in poorer regions.
36
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It is generally accepted that the economy's performance affects the  voters'
decisions when they approach the polls. The voters penalize the government for poor
economic performance in the times of recession by voting for the opposition. The
countries of Central and Eastern Europe went through severe recession since they
started the programs of economic and political reforms. Although the reforms enjoyed
tremendous public support at their outset, this support deteriorated rather quickly as
the reforms progressed. In this paper, we look at some of the economic factors
potentially affecting formation of voters' preferences. The key ingredients are the threat
of unemployment and diminishing probability of switching from a job in the state sector
to a private sector job.
To study the impact of unemployment upon voters' preferences, we build on a
model developed in Rodrik [1995]. This model simulates an economy consisting of a
state sector and  a private  sector. During the transition process, the state sector
contracts while the  private sector  expands and transitional unemployment occurs.
However, our model differs from Rodrik in three important aspects: unemployment
does not vanish even after the transition is completed, unemployment benefits enter
into the government's policy choice, and an exogenous shock to the state sector occurs
at the outset of the transition.
                                               
35 Both Slovak elections were included. Polish presidential elections were not included.
36 These results are not presented here but are available upon request.The government chooses the level of subsidy to the state sector as well as the
unemployment benefits. The higher these are the lower is the speed of transition. The
government expenditure is financed by a tax  on the private sector. We study the
evolution of voters' preferences for the level of subsidy. It is shown that the workers
employed in the private sector will alw ays support lowest subsidy possible since it
reduces their earnings. The workers in the state sector and  unemployed  may also
support a low level of the subsidy early in the transition process. This is so because the
probability that they get a private-sector job in the future is high at this stage and lower
subsidy thus increases their expected future earnings. However, after certain point, the
other effect of increasing the subsidy dominates. As the probability of getting a private-
sector job falls with the progress of restructuring, the expected utility of the state-
sector workers will increase if the subsidy is raised. The same holds for  the
unemployed. Hence, later during the transition, state-sector workers and unemployed
will prefer the highest level of subsidy possible. They will thus support slowing down
the pace of reforms.
To test these conclusions, we then use data on recent elections in the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The analysis is performed by running
regressions of regional election results on regional unemployment rates (at the level of
counties). The results display overall support for the conclusions, showing negative
relationship between the election results of the pro-reform parties and unemployment
and positive relationship between the  election results of the  left-wing parties and
unemployment. The results for the nationalist parties are in general weaker and mixed.
These results show that the continuation of the economic reforms can indeed
be put at question if unemployment gets too high. This explains the strong showing of
post-communists in Poland and Hungary and left-wing nationalists in Slovakia as well
as in many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It also explains the strong
position of reformists in the Czech Republic where the unemployment rate is low.
A policy implication, derived from these results, could be that the economic
reforms should be designed in such a way as to avoid excessive unemployment. This
does not necessarily imply support for a gradual approach to reforms though. High
unemployment was recorded both in Poland, where a shock-therapy reform has been
pursued, as well as in Hungary where the reforms were more gradual. In fact, a rather
fast restructuring through privatization may indeed prove to be less painful and costly
than slow marketizing of state-owned enterprises. It is not just the excessive
unemployment  that  can  put  continuation of the reforms at question. The larger is the
portion of labor force remaining in the state sector at the time of elections, the greater
is the chance left-wing parties will claim victory. The Czech Republic seems to
document this fact.
It should also be noted that although the reformists were voted out of power in
Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, the very continuation of the  reforms has  not been
threatened in any of these countries.VIII.   APPENDIX I: DATA SOURCES
The Czech Republic:
Statistical Yearbook 1991, Czech Statistical Office
The Czech Republic, More than Prague, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna,
Austria; CERGE, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic and The Economics
Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic, 1994
Vysledky voleb do FS a CNR 1992 (Results of Election to the Federal Parliament and
the Czech National Council, 1992), Czech Statistical Office
Slovakia:
The Bulletin, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, various issues
The Slovak Republic After One Year of Independence, Institute for Advanced Studies,
Vienna, Austria and Center for Economic Strategies of the  Slovak  Republic,
Bratislava, Slovakia, 1994
Vysledky hlasovania, politicke strany podla okresov (Election Results by Counties),
Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 1992
Volby do Narodnej rady Slovenskej republiky (Elections to the National Council of the
Slovak Republic), Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 1994
Hungary:
Hungary, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria, 1995
A teruleti listak eredmenyei, Magyar Nemzet, May 10, 1994, p.3
Poland:
Rocznik Statystyczny (Statistical Yearbook), Main Statistical Office, 1991-1994
Poland, Eastern Europe's Tiger, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria and
Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland, 1995
Bulletin of Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data, East European
Politics and Societies Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 369-79
Polish 1995 Presidential Elections, data courtesy of Internet Technologies
Polska, downloaded from URL http://www.it.com.pl/wybory95
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Development of GDP, Inflation and Unemployment in CEE and FSU.
GDP, 1989=100
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996E 1997E
CZ 98.8 84.8 79.3 78.6 80.7 84.5 88.9 93.4
SK 97.5 83.4 77.5 74.3 77.9 83.7 88.7 93.1
H 96.5 85.0 82.5 81.8 84.2 85.4 86.7 89.3
PL 88.4 81.7 83.8 87.0 91.2 97.5 102.9 109.1
SLO 95.3 87.6 82.9 83.9 88.1 91.2 93.9 97.7
BG 90.9 80.3 74.4 72.6 73.6 75.6 75.6 77.8
RO 94.4 82.2 74.0 75.0 77.5 82.9 86.2 90.5
RUS 98.0 85.3 69.1 60.7 51.6 49.5 48.5 49.5
UKR 97.4 86.1 74.3 63.8 51.6 45.5 43.3 44.1
Inflation
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996E 1997E
CZ 9.7 56.6 11.1 20.8 10.0 7.9 8.2 8.0
SK 10.4 61.2 10.0 23.2 11.7 7.2 7.0 7.0
H 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.0 24.0 18.0
PL 585.8 70.3 43.0 35.3 29.4 27.8 22.0 15.0
SLO 551.6 115.0 207.3 32.9 21.0 12.6 11.0 9.0
BG 23.8 338.5 91.3 72.9 96.2 62.2 120.0 60.0
RO 5.1 174.5 210.9 290.3 136.8 32.3 30.0 30.0
RUS 5.3 92.6 1460.2 840.0 300.0 198.0 60.0 40.0
UKR 4.8 91.2 1210.0 5371.0 981.0 377.0 90.0 50.0
Unemployment
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996E 1997E
CZ 0.8 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.0 3.0
SK 1.6 11.8 10.4 14.4 14.8 13.1 13.0 13.0
H 1.9 8.5 12.3 12.1 11.5 10.9 11.0 10.0
PL 6.3 11.8 13.6 15.7 16.0 14.9 14.0 14.0
SLO 5.8 10.1 13.4 15.4 14.2 14.5 14.0 13.0
BG 1.7 11.1 15.2 16.4 12.8 11.1 12.0 11.0
RO 3.0 8.4 10.4 10.9 8.9 10.0 10.0
RUS 0.1 0.8 1.2 2.2 3.2 5.0 8.0
UKR 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 2.0 9.0
Source: WIIW Handbook of Statistics 1995. P - preliminary figures; E - estimate.Table II
Regression Results: Analysis of Voters' Preferences
CZ Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat Moravia t-stat
76 obs. ODS
1 0.38 33.30 33.31 *** -1.48 -4.25 *** -2.73 -2.60 ***
ODA
1 0.23 7.48 9.83 *** -0.46 -1.72 * -2.45 -3.07 ***
KDU-CSL
1 0.43 4.80 5.81 *** -0.09 -0.32 5.82 6.71 ***
OH
1, 2 0.45 5.57 22.22 *** -0.34 -3.91 *** -1.06 -4.02 ***
LB
2 0.18 12.27 18.85 *** 0.92 4.07 *** -1.14 -1.67 *
CSSD
2 0.43 7.36 22.34 *** 0.11 0.99 -2.41 -6.97 ***
LSU
2 0.31 7.18 10.42 *** 0.62 2.58 ** -4.15 -5.74 ***
SPR-RSC
3 0.07 5.50 8.60 *** 0.44 1.98 ** -1.38 -2.06 **
HSD-SMS
2, 4 0.90 0.37 0.63 0.04 0.20 14.13 22.46 ***
SK92 Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat H.Min. t-stat
38 obs. KDH
1 0.45 6.56 2.76 *** 0.39 1.90 ** -0.18 -5.27 ***
ODU
1 0.05 5.02 3.90 *** -0.10 -0.90 -0.01 -0.42
DS
1 0.20 4.97 5.73 *** -0.16 -2.18 ** -0.01 -0.82
HZDS
2, 3 0.52 47.95 8.17 *** -0.50 -0.98 -0.43 -5.00 ***
SDL
2 0.27 9.29 3.07 *** 0.67 2.55 ** -0.15 -3.45 ***
SDSS
2 0.19 2.92 2.51 ** 0.16 1.62 -0.05 -2.89 ***
SNS
3 0.41 13.48 7.90 *** -0.55 -3.68 *** -0.03 -1.30
MK
5 0.99 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.70 58.00 ***
SK94 Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat H.Min. t-stat
38 obs. KDH
1 0.45 9.30 3.88 *** 0.23 1.12 -0.18 -5.21 ***
DU
1 0.35 13.64 8.36 *** -0.49 -3.47 *** -0.02 -0.81
DS
1 0.41 5.26 9.06 *** -0.17 -3.26 *** -0.02 -1.80 *
HZDS
2, 3 0.60 39.84 7.97 *** 0.08 0.17 -0.48 -6.58 ***
SV
2 0.08 10.91 6.62 *** -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -1.56
ZRS
2 0.27 5.85 3.56 *** 0.25 1.75 * -0.09 -3.63 ***
SNS
3 0.35 8.39 7.12 *** -0.27 -2.67 *** -0.03 -1.82 *
MK
5 1.00 0.56 0.90 -0.07 -1.36 0.95 106.11 ***
H Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat
20 obs. MDF
1 0.28 14.03 11.84 *** -0.15 -2.62 **
Fidesz
1 0.01 7.47 8.68 *** -0.01 -0.33
SzDSz
1 0.37 25.40 14.00 *** -0.29 -3.28 ***
MSzP
2 0.12 27.10 7.44 *** 0.28 1.54
MP
2 0.36 -0.80 -0.58 0.22 3.17 ***
KDNP
3 0.01 6.85 4.15 *** 0.03 0.35
FKgP
3 0.02 11.02 5.41 *** -0.07 -0.66
MIEP
3 0.04 1..90 1.99 * -0.04 -0.88
PL Party/Cand. R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat
49 obs. UD
1 0.12 13.20 7.23 *** -0.24 -2.47 **
BBWR
2 0.12 6.86 8.64 *** -0.10 -2.49 **
UP
1, 2 0.00 6.69 5.45 *** -0.01 -0.21
SLD
2 0.18 13.04 5.52 *** 0.40 3.19 ***
PSL
2 0.01 17.05 3.81 *** 0.12 0.52
KPN
3 0.12 7.69 8.17 *** -0.13 -2.61 ***
Kwasniewski 0.33 32.58 6.74 *** 1.21 4.76 ***
Walesa 0.33 67.42 13.96 *** -1.21 -4.76 ***
Notes:  Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and significance levels (*** significant at 1 % or less, **
5 % or smaller, * 10 % or smaller). Sample sizes are in the first column.
Political orientation: 
1 proreform party, 
2 left-wing party, 
3 nationalist party, 
4 party advocating
Moravian interests (Czech Republic), 
5 party advocating Hungarian interests (Slovakia).Table III
Regression Results: Analysis of Voters' Preferences, groups of parties according
to their political orientation
CZ Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat Moravia t-stat
76 obs. REF 0.41 58.77 43.00 *** -2.44 -5.11 *** -2.67 -1.86 **
LEFT 0.49 31.00 30.42 *** 1.73 4.87 *** -8.94 -8.35 ***
SK92 Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat H.Min. t-stat
38 obs. REF 0.34 16.56 5.11 *** 0.13 0.46 -0.20 -4.27 ***
LEFT 0.29 15.74 3.55 *** 1.00 2.57 ** -0.23 -3.58 ***
NAT 0.57 65.53 9.43 *** -1.10 -1.82 * -0.51 -4.97 ***
HUN 1.00 0.88 1.18 -0.12 -1.77 * 0.95 87.70 ***
SK94 Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat H.Min. t-stat
38 obs. REF 0.47 28.25 8.84 *** -0.22 -1.18 -0.23 -4.61 ***
LEFT 0.24 20.00 6.22 *** 0.32 1.75 * -0.16 -3.31 ***
NAT 0.61 52.22 9.90 *** -0.22 -0.73 -0.54 -6.58 ***
HUN 1.00 0.56 0.90 -0.07 -1.36 0.95 106.11 ***
H Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat
20 obs. REF 0.53 49.89 22.70 *** -0.46 -4.52 ***
LEFT 0.32 29.32 8.27 *** 0.51 2.91 ***
NAT 0.12 23.55 11.05 *** -0.16 -1.55
PL Party R
2 Intrcpt t-stat Unempl t-stat
49 obs. REF 0.09 26.76 8.76 *** -0.36 -2.21 **
LEFT 0.11 30.09 7.52 *** 0.52 2.47 ***
Notes:   Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and significance levels (*** significant at 1 % or less, **
5 % or smaller, * 10 % or smaller). Sample sizes are in the first column.
Classification of party groups:
CZ: REF = ODS + ODA + KDU/CSL + OH + D92 + SCSP + KAN; LEFT = LB + CSSD + LSU +
HZDJ; SK92: REF = KDH + ODU + DS; LEFT = SDL + SDSS + SZS + SZ + KSS; NAT = HZDS +
SNS + SKDH; HUN = MK + MOS; SK94: REF = KDH + DU + DS + HPCS; LEFT = SV + ZRS +
KSS + NS + SPK; NAT = HZDS + SNS + KSU; HUN = MK; H: REF = MFD + SzDSz + Fidesz;
LEFT = MSzP + MP + MSDP + AS; NAT = KDNP + FKgP + MIEP; PL: REF = UD + BBWR + UP;
LEFT = SLD + PSL. See Appendix II for full names of the parties.
Table IV
Regression Results: Analysis of Voters' Preferences, pooled sample
R
2 Unem CZ SK H PL
REF 0.84 -0.34 51.85 23.01 44.60 26.54
t-stat -3.54 *** 4.05 *** 14.20 *** 18.51 *** 13.28 ***
LEFT 0.47 0.28 32.40 19.55 31.62 34.50
t-stat 2.74 *** 38.24 *** 11.53 *** 12.55 *** 16.50 ***
NAT 0.80 -0.71 8.40 55.62 34.31 18.26
t-stat -5.15 *** 7.28 *** 24.07 *** 9.99 *** 6.41 ***
Notes:   Coefficient estimates, t-statistics and significance levels (*** significant at 1 % or less, **
5 % or smaller, * 10 % or smaller). CZ, SK, H and PL refer to country dummies. Sample size: 221.Table V








OF 49.50 ODS-KDS 29.73 VPN 29.35 HZDS 37.26 HZDS 34.96
KSC 13.24 LB 14.05 KDH 19.21 SDL 14.70 SV 10.41
HSD-SMS 10.03 CSSD 6.53 SNS 13.94 KDH 8.89 MK 10.18
KDU 8.42 LSU 6.52 KSC 13.35 SNS 7.93 KDH 10.08
KDU-CSL 6.28 Egyu. 8.66 Egyu. 7.42 DU 8.57
Rep. 5.98 DS 4.40 ZRS 7.34













MDF 24.70 MSzP 32.99 UD 12.31 SLD 20.40
SzDSz 21.30 SzDSz 19.74 SLD 11.98 PSL 15.40
FKgP 11.70 MDF 11.74 ZChN 8.73 UD 10.60
MSzP 10.90 FKgP 8.82 PC 8.71 KPN 5.80
Fidesz 8.90 KDNP 7.03 PSL 8.67 UP 7.30
KDNP 6.50 Fidesz 7.02 KPN 7.50 BBWR 5.40









1 Source: Czechoslovak Statistical Office
2 Source: Czech Statistical Office
3 Source: Slovak Statistical Office
4 Source: Olsen (1995)
5 Source: Central Statistical Office of the Republic of Poland
6 Refers to the percentage of votes cast for the parties that were not eventually represented in the
parliament.
7 Refers to the votes cast for 20 small parties that were also represented in the parliament.
Table reports percentages of valid votes cast for the individual parties in the elections to the following
representative bodies:
Czech Republic - Czech National Council (CNR),
Slovakia - Slovak National Council (SNR),
Hungary - National Parliament, votes cast on the regional lists (proportional vote),
Poland - Sejm (lower house, proportional vote).List of Main Parties:
CZECH REPUBLIC 1992:
ODS-KDS Civid Democratic Party & Christian Democratic Party
LB Left Block
CSSD Czechoslovak Social Democracy
LSU Liberal Social Union
KDU-CSL Christian Democratic Union - Czechoslovak People's Party
SPR-RSC Union for the Republic - Republican Party
ODA Civid Democratic Aliance
HSD-SMS Movement for Independent Democracy - Society for Moravia & Silesia
OH Civic Movement
SLOVAKIA 1992:
HZDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
SDL Party of Democratic Left
KDH Christian Democratic Movement
SNS Slovak National Party
MK Hungarian Coalition
ODU Civid Democratic Union
SDSS Social Democratic Party of Slovakia
DS Democratic Party
SLOVAKIA 1994:
HZDS Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
SV Common Choice
MK Hungarian Coalition
KDH Christian Democratic Movement
DU Democratic Union
ZRS Association Workers of Slovakia
SNS Slovak National Party
DS Democratic Party
HUNGARY 1994:
MSzP Hungarian Socialist Party
SDS Alliance of Free Democrats
MDF Forum of Hungarian Democrats
Fidesz Alliance of Young Democrats
KDNP Christian Democratic Public Party
FKP Independent Small-farmers Party
MIEP Party of Hungarian Truth and Life
MP Workers' party
POLAND 1993
SLD Democratic Left Aliance
PSL Polish Peasant Party
UD Democratic Union
UP Union of Labor
KPN Confederation for an Independent Poland











































Evolution of Employment in the State and
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N0 = .80, M0 = .20, U
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Evolution of Probabilities for State-Sector
Workers. A worker who held a state-sector job
at time t will have a private-sector job with
probability rt, be unemployed with probability
ct and remain in the state sector with












































Evolution of Employment in the State and
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N0 = .80, M0 = .20, U
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Evolution of Employment in the State and
Private Sectors, Unemployment and Output;
N0 = .80, M0 = .20, U
~ = .05, N* = .20, M* =














































Evolution of Probabilities for Unemployed
Workers. A worker who was unemployed at
time t will have a private-sector job with
probability rt, hold a state-sector job with
probability dt and remain unemployed with











































Evolution of Expected Utility Functions of
Workers who are Employed in the State Sector
(Ws), Private Sector (Wp) or Unemployed
(Wu) at Time t. Legend: 10 period time

























































Relationship between Unemploy-ment and




































































Relationship between Unemploy-ment and








































































Relationship between Unemploy-ment and








































































































Relationship between Unemploy-ment and






































































Relationship between Unemploy-ment and
Political Preferences, Groups of Parties